When the Levite on the road from Jericho to Jerusalem passed by the unfortunate man who had been assaulted by robbers, it perhaps occurred to him when he was still a little distance from the unfortunate man that it would indeed be beautiful to help a sufferer. He may have even already though of how rewarding such a good deed is in itself; he perhaps was riding more slowly because he was immersed in thought; but as he came closer and closer, the difficulties became apparent, and he rode past. Now he probably rode fast in order to get away quickly, away from the thought of the possible nearness of robbers, and away from the thought of how easily the victim could confuse him with the robbers who had left him lying there. Consequently he did not act. but suppose that along the way repentance brought him back; suppose that he quickly turned around, fearing neither robbers nor other difficulties, fearing only to arrive too late. Suppose that he did come too late, inasmuch as the compassionate Samaritan had already had the sufferer brought to the inn - had he, then, not acted? (kierkegaard, concluding postscripts, 340)
I say the Levite did nothing. If the distance between goodness and sin is measured by the height of the Levite's willingness to help and his sudden indecision, this results in the practical death of the sufferer. What good is the Levite's repentance if he had already forsaken that situation and the sufferer had already died? The moment the Levite rode past the sufferer, the sufferer died - which is a permanent matter and something that is not altered by the repentance of a third party.
If goodness is based on a criterion of the well-being of the other person, then goodness can only exist from the moment the Levite met the sufferer. Anything afterwards would have been equal to condemnation of the weak. Even if he returns in repentance, he is trying of his own will to remedy a situation that he had already permanently forsaken.
yea? nay?
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